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ABSTRACT 
How do institutions affect auditor reporting behavior?  
Empirical evidence from China 
 
By 
 
AN Yang 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
It is well documented in cross-country research that institutions, both economic 
and political, affect the reporting behavior of auditors and audit services. These 
findings are based on the assumption that institutions vary across countries but are 
more homogeneous within a country. However, cross-country research suffers from 
the problems of country-specific cultures, accounting rules, and regulations, and can 
be criticized for the use of small sample sizes, potential endogeneity, and the 
correlation of omitted variables. This study overcomes these problems by engaging 
in within-country research. Specifically, this study examines how variations in the 
institutional environment within China affect auditor reporting behavior. Since the 
initiation of the open door policy in the early 1980s, China’s institutional 
environment has, from both the economic and political perspectives, undergone 
different development stages that have moved east to west across the provinces. This 
thesis takes advantage of these special institutional characteristics in China to test the 
influence of institutions on auditor reporting behavior within a single country. 
 
Based on the NERI Index (2001) of Marketization (NIM) (Fan and Wang, 2003), 
I classify China’s 30 provinces into “good” and “poor” institutional regions. In poor 
regions, the local economy is more influenced by local governments, and suffers 
from an underdeveloped credit market and a poorer legal environment. Taking into 
account the close relationship between local governments and local 
government-owned companies, the absolute power of resource allocation by 
governments, and the low litigation risk, I hypothesize that auditors in poor 
institutional regions tend to be lenient to local government-owned companies by 
issuing them with more unqualified initial and subsequent audit opinions. 
 
I collected 8,039 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market, the 
results from which provide evidence to support the hypotheses. This study extends 
the previous research of Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) by revealing that the lenient 
reporting behavior of local auditors toward local government-owned companies is 
more prevalent in regions with a poor institutional environment. The findings of this 
thesis have rich implications for policy-makers and regulators in China. One 
implication is that institutional improvement is a key factor in the creation of a 
quality audit profession, even when uniform national auditing regulations have been 
established. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This chapter summarizes the motivation, research objectives, and main findings 
of this study. The theoretical contributions and practical implications of the study are 
also discussed. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
A growing body of research has shown that institutions, both economic and 
political, affect auditor behavior (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Choi and Wong, 2005) 
and audit services (Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2003). For example, Ball, Robin 
and Wu (2003) find that differences in institutional environment are associated with a 
variation in financial reporting quality, and specifically that economies with more 
market-oriented characteristics, including stronger professional accounting bodies 
and higher expected litigation costs, are associated with better reporting quality. Choi 
and Wong (2005) suggest that a country’s poor legal environment significantly 
weakens the demand for and supply of quality audits, and lessens the role of auditing 
as a bonding mechanism and a credible signal. Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2003) 
also document that countries with legal systems with stronger investor protection are 
more likely to have a higher auditing quality. However, these studies all use a 
cross-country research setting, based on the assumption that institutional 
environments vary across countries but are more homogeneous within a country. 
Schultz and Lopez (2001) argue that differences in infrastructure, culture, and 
socioeconomic and political systems across countries may lead to noncomparable 
accounting numbers. In addition, to the extent that the assumption underlying these 
 2
studies does not hold, the reported results will be subject to bias. Miller (2004) points 
out the limitations of studies based on cross-country analysis, suggesting that they 
suffer from the effects of country-specific accounting rules or regulations, small 
sample sizes, potential endogeneity, and correlated omitted variables. 
This study overcomes the problems associated with cross-country research by 
using a within-country setting. China is a country with notable variations in 
institutional environment across regions. For example, Fan and Wang (2003) show 
that institutional development has not been uniform across the country, and Wong, 
Wang and Xia (2005) demonstrate that such institutional disparity can result in 
different incentives for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to pursue high quality audits. 
Variations in China’s institutional development thus provide a unique setting for 
examining the association between institutions and auditor reporting behavior. China 
is chosen for study because of this special institutional development, which was 
brought about by economic reform and the gradual implementation of the open door 
policy over the past 30 years. Under such gradual reform strategies, which have been 
rolled out from coastal to inland regions and from east to west, different provinces 
have made unbalanced institutional progress that has resulted in different levels of 
marketization. According to the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index 
(2001) of Marketization (IM) for China’s 30 provinces and autonomous regions, 
which was compiled by Fan and Wang (2003), the institutional environment in 
eastern coastal provinces is much better than that in other regions. This unique 
situation provides a good opportunity to look into the relationship between 
institutions and auditor reporting behavior within a country.  
China’s particular setting has led me to reconsider the results of former studies 
on Chinese auditor reporting behavior. For example, Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) find 
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that Chinese local auditors tend to be lenient in issuing unqualified audit opinions to 
local government-owned companies in order to retain important clients. Their study 
reveals a strong political and economic relationship between local auditors and their 
clients. However, they do not provide evidence of whether this strong relationship 
occurs uniformly across all of the regions of China, and thus the empirical question 
remains as to whether institutional disparity affects auditor behavior. A similar study 
by Wong, Wang and Xia (2005) examines how China’s institutional environment 
distorts the way in which SOEs hire auditors. They reveal that in regions in which 
the institutional environment is better developed (with the state withdrawing from 
controlling the economy and a more efficient credit market and legal environment), 
SOEs have more incentive to hire high-quality auditors. However, they do not 
consider the institutional variations in China when investigating the supply side. 
Specifically, they reveal that small local auditors may be submissive to political 
power, and are thus more likely to grant favorable audit opinions to SOEs, but do not 
show whether this phenomenon is consistent across the country. This thesis 
contributes to the relevant literature by further researching the behavior of auditors in 
the unique institutional environment of China. 
 
1.2 Research Objective 
The institutional environment is important in auditing behavior research. The 
objective of this study is to extend previous research on the association between 
institutional development and auditing behavior. Specifically, this study attempts to 
empirically test whether institutional heterogeneity results in different auditor 
reporting behavior. Based on the work of Chan, Lin and Mo (2006), who find that 
Chinese auditors tend to be lenient to retain important clients, I hypothesize that 
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because institutions vary across regions of China, the extent to which local auditors 
are lenient in issuing clean opinions to local government-owned clients will also vary. 
Further, I expect the leniency of local auditors to be greater in poor institutional 
regions.1  
This thesis adopts the same definition of local auditors as that used by Wong, 
Wang and Xia (2005), that is, that an auditor is considered to be local if it (or its 
branch) is located in the same province (or equivalent in China) as the client. When 
auditors from two or more regions merge to form a new auditor, both the original 
registry regions of the auditors engaged in the merger and the new registry region 
after merger are treated as the registry regions of the new audit firm, because the new 
auditor is likely to be influenced by the local governments of both its new registry 
region of the merged firm and the registry regions of the original firms prior to the 
merger (Wong, Wang and Xia, 2005).2 The Big 4 in this thesis are classified in the 
same way. Liu and Zhou (2005) indicate that the audit quality of the Big 4 in China 
is not higher than that of domestic auditors, as the Big 4 are affected by Chinese 
                                                        
1In accordance with the National Economic Research Institute Index compiled by Fan and Wang 
(2003), I classify China’s 30 provinces or regions into “good” and “poor” institutional regions 
based on their level of institutional development. I intend to find out whether there is generally a 
disparity in the lenient reporting behavior of Chinese local auditors in developed regions and 
undeveloped regions. The goal of this thesis is not to investigate how such behavioral disparity 
varies in specific provinces in China, and I therefore do not use the raw index of these provinces 
as a proxy for institutional development level. Nevertheless, raw data are also used in robust test 
for H1b. The variable INSTit in H1b takes the specific marks of the 30 provinces as provided by 
Fan and Wang (2003). The results indicate that the interaction term INSTit*LocGovit is 
significantly positively correlated with dependent variable at the 0.01 level, suggesting that, local 
government-owned companies are more likely to receive unqualified audit opinions in regions 
with less developed institutional environments. These results are consistent with the main results 
reported in Chapter 5.  
2 In other words, the merged audit firm will still be influenced by the local government where 
the merged firm is located prior to the merger, although the clients’ total assets of the merged 
auditor may account for much less than 50% of the total clients’ assets of the newly organized 
auditor.  
In the sample of this thesis, only 4 auditors are not identified as a local auditor in any one region, 
and 32 relevant observations are involved. I conduct robust test without including these 32 
observations, and the results are consistent with the main results. Besides, since an auditor is 
considered to be local if it or its branches are located in the same province as the client, more 
than half of all audit firms are identified as local auditors in more than one region. 
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institutional environment, such as closed relationship with government agencies and 
low litigation risks. Therefore, the Big 4 are also classified as local auditors as long 
as their offices are located in the same provinces as their clients. In terms of the 
classification of ownership, I choose 20% as the cutoff for determining controlling 
rights, that is, a listed firm is defined as a local government-owned company if its 
largest shareholder is a local government entity that owns at least 20% of the total 
shares outstanding. 
 
1.3 Main findings 
Based on 8,039 firm-year observations during the period 1996-2005, the 
regression results suggest that although China’s local audit firms show a similar 
degree of leniency in issuing unqualified opinions about local government-owned 
companies (Chan, Lin and Mo, 2006), local auditors in regions with a poor 
institutional environment are more likely to issue unqualified opinions to local 
government-owned listed companies than their counterparts in regions with a good 
institutional environment. To reinforce my main findings, I further examine whether 
qualified companies are more likely to succeed in opinion shopping after switching 
to local auditors in poor regions rather than to non-local auditors in the same regions. 
Similarly, I also examine whether these companies are more likely to succeed in 
opinion shopping after switching to local auditors in different institutional regions. 
The regression results show that for qualified companies that switched to regions 
with poor institutional environments, local auditors are more likely than non-local 
auditors to issue a subsequent clean audit opinion to local government-owned 
companies. However, the difference in local auditors’ subsequent audit behavior in 
poor and good regions appears insignificant. 
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1.4 Contributions of the study 
1.4.1 Theoretical contributions 
This study contributes to the existing research on the political-economic 
analysis of auditor reporting behavior. Similar to the work of Chen, Sun and Wang 
(2002), who study whether harmonized accounting standards lead to harmonized 
accounting practice in China, I conduct this study by using within-country, 
firm-specific data to overcome the major limitations of cross-country studies that 
have been highlighted. Miller (2004) points out that the limitation of a small sample 
size is caused by the unavailability of data from some target countries, and that 
similarity in the characteristics of the sampled countries can lead to endogeneity. 
Miller (2004) also remarks that the problem of noisy variables makes research results 
vulnerable even when the changes in the sample are only small. Moreover, 
overlooking particular events that occur across countries during the study period can 
induce the problem of correlated omitted variables. 
This thesis extends the recent studies by Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) and Wong, 
Wang and Xia (2005). Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) examine whether auditor reporting 
behavior is affected by institutional factors such as political and economic influences 
from government, and Wong, Wang and Xia (2005) examine how the institutional 
features of transition economies (i.e., the government ownership of firms, 
government power over external auditors, and market and legal failure) distort the 
incentives of SOEs in hiring auditors, and how audit behavior differs between small 
local auditors and other auditors in China. However, although this study shares many 
similarities with these two works, it differs in that I classify the various provinces of 
China into “good” and “poor” regions, and further test how the relationship between 
auditor reporting behavior and institutional environment varies across regions of 
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China. My results show that the degree of leniency that auditors extend toward local 
government-owned companies differs across regions with different institutional 
environments. Specifically, local auditors in poor institutional regions are more likely 
to be lenient, whereas their counterparts in good areas are more independent of local 
government-owned companies. The variations in auditor reporting behavior caused 
by institutional heterogeneity result from China’s reform policy, which has given 
priority to the development of coastal areas. A further distinction from the study of 
Wong, Wang and Xia (2005) is that I examine the institutional influence on 
subsequent audit opinions, and find that opinion shopping by switching auditors is 
more likely to succeed in poor institutional regions. Appendix 1 provides a more 
detail comparison between this thesis and Wong, Wang and Xia (2005). In sum, this 
thesis complements the two previous studies by further classifying the provinces of 
China according to their institutional development levels and testing how such 
institutional variation affects subsequent audit opinions. 
1.4.2 Policy implications 
My findings have some policy implications for Chinese regulators, who have 
been making efforts to establish a high-quality auditing market in China. For 
example, although China’s central government has issued a series of regulations to 
foster the independence of auditing firms, as will be elaborated later, these measures 
are not in themselves sufficient to create a quality audit profession. Rather, the 
institutional environment also plays a crucial role in developing an independent audit 
market. My findings suggest that Chinese regulators, and especially those in regions 
with a poor institutional environment, should improve local institutions by limiting 
government intervention in the local economy, improving the legal environment, and 
further developing the local credit market.  
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1.5 Organization of the thesis 
The organization of the remaining sections of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 
describes the institutional background of China and the variation in institutional 
development across the country’s regions. Chapter 3 develops the research 
hypotheses. The research methodology and data collection are presented in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 discusses the empirical results, and Chapter 6 concludes.  
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Chapter 2 
The Institutional Background and Audit Market in 
China 
 
Institutions play an active role in shaping the behavior of audit firms and the 
relationship among auditors, local government, and listed companies in China. In this 
chapter, I first describe the historical development of institutions in China, and then 
explain how variations in these institutions influence the audit market.  
 
2.1 Relationships among auditors, local government, and listed 
companies in China 
2.1.1 The supply of audit services 
Before China implemented its economic reform and open door policy in 1979, 
it had a command economy, with the government setting prices and allocating 
resources for all enterprises and SOEs dominating the national economy. Under these 
circumstances, there was little need for audit services. The professional audit service 
in China was initially created in 1979 to meet the demands of foreign investors 
(DeFond, Wong and Li, 2000). However, the majority of new audit firms were under 
the control of local governments. The market for audit services was highly protected 
by local governments, and sponsoring government units could exert their 
administrative power to procure clients for the firms and shield them from market 
competition and the treat of litigation (Yang, Tang, Kilgore and Hong, 2001). Until 
recently, local governments still had great power to control audit fees. According to 
Sheng and Liu (2006), although the Chinese government has in principle followed 
the regulations on audit fees set out in the Rules of Professional Ethics of Certified 
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Public Accountants in 2002, such fees in China are actually stipulated by local 
finance administration departments and pricing authorities. There is therefore no 
actual uniform criterion for audit fees in China: rather, they are heavily influenced by 
local governments. 
Due to a lack of capital, most audit firms in the 1980s were established and 
sponsored by local government agencies (DeFond, Wong and Li, 2000; Tang, 1999), 
which means that most were in some way affiliated with the government. This 
affiliation of audit firms with local government agencies meant that auditors lacked 
independence, and local auditors became tools of regional protectionism, as the 
sponsoring agencies often demanded that the companies located within their 
administrative territory be audited by the audit firms that they sponsored (Chan, Lin 
and Mo, 2006; Yang, Tang, Kilgore and Hong, 2001). 
To meet the rapid development of the capital markets in 1990s, China 
implemented a series of reforms to set up a credible independent auditing profession. 
In 1995, independent auditing standards were promulgated, and in 1997 the Ministry 
of Finance and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) began to 
disaffiliate audit firms from their sponsoring government agencies. However, the 
close relationship between local governments and local auditors remains. For 
example, some audit firms still use the offices of their sponsors, enjoy the welfare 
given out by former local government agencies, and hire government officers as 
consultants. Because of these close ties, local governments are still able to exert a 
strong political influence on local auditors, and can affect the judgment and type of 
audit report issued by sponsored auditors to help listed companies in their 
jurisdictions embellish their financial reports (Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000; Tang, 
1999). 
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According to an investigation conducted by the chief accounting officer of the 
CSRC, by the end of 2004, 64% of the total assets of clients were audited by the top 
10 audit firms, with the top 10 audit firms taking 428 clients (31%) and the other 62 
audit firms competing for the remaining 959 clients. Because of this unbalanced 
market situation, many local auditors are obliged to maintain a close relationship 
with local government agencies to retain old clients or to acquire new clients, as most 
of the listed companies in China are still actually owned by local governments (Chan, 
Lin and Mo, 2006). The fierce competition for clients has forced many local auditors 
to compromise their professional independence to survive.  
Another factor that makes some audit firms in less developed areas 
economically vulnerable is their lack of pricing power. Sheng and Liu (2006) argue 
that in well-developed provinces in which most audit fees are contracted by auditors 
and their clients, audit fees are more market based, but that in less market-based 
regions, audit fees are regulated by local governments. For example, local 
governments still set price ceilings and sometimes even require auditors to reduce the 
audit fee for local government-owned companies that are in financial distress. This 
pricing intervention negatively affects auditor reporting behavior, because the low 
audit fee forces audit firms to reduce the scope of their audits to retain a minimum 
profit margin, which severely damages audit quality.  
2.1.2 The demand for audit services 
Concentrated corporate ownership has reduced the demand for independent 
auditing in China (Chan, Lin and Zhang, 2007). For example, 83% of the companies 
sampled in this study were controlled by local governments at the end of 2005, with 
the largest local governmental shareholders on average owning 36% of the total 
shares. As shares owned by government entities cannot be traded, the aim of such 
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entities is not to maximize shareholder wealth, but to pursue political or social 
objectives, such as developing infrastructure and providing relief for the fiscal and 
unemployment problems of their region (Lin, Cai and Li, 2000). Some firm leaders 
can even gain promotion by improving firm performance (Li and Zhou, 2005), a 
good example being the incentives created by Chinese local governments to direct 
the managers of SOEs to manage earnings before initial public offering (IPO) 
(Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000). Local governments consider having a listed 
company in their region as a symbol of wealth and prestige (Chen, Chen and Su, 
2001), and often rely on listed companies as a source of capital. They therefore have 
a strong incentive to direct management to report earnings that meet the profitability 
criteria to avoid delisting, and also have an incentive to direct managers to select an 
auditor that will not challenge such biased reporting (Chan, Lin and Mo, 2006; Chen, 
Chen and Su, 2001; DeFond, Wong and Li, 2000).  
In China, local governments can assist SOEs financially and politically through 
various means, such as tax refunds, fiscal subsidies, and credit facilities from 
state-owned banks, to achieve certain non-economic goals. This unusual relationship 
between local governments and listed companies often distorts the attitude of equity 
investors. Investors are supposed to care about audit quality and audit independence, 
but investors in China often perceive the survival of listed firms to be ensured by the 
controlling government entities, rather than by efficient management and a good 
financial status. They believe that the controlling government entities can help to 
boost the performance of their subsidiaries in a variety of ways, such as selling them 
valuable assets at below market prices (DeFond, Wong and Li, 2000), offering them 
credit facilities from state-owned banks, and granting them tax refunds, and care 
little for whether the audit report is independent and of good quality. Without 
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significant pressure from equity investors, local governments often prevent or delay a 
company’s failure by allowing or encouraging it to cover up its losses (Ball, Robin 
and Wu, 2003). 
The lack of a sound legal system also reduces the litigation risks for Chinese 
auditors. In China, the pace of legal reform lags far behind that of economic reform 
(Clarke, 1996), and the corporate governance mechanisms that protect minority 
shareholders have not reached maturity (DeFond, Wong and Li, 2000). Minority 
shareholders in China may doubt the truthfulness of a firm’s accounting information, 
but they lack the ability to monitor the management or to pursue legal action (Chan, 
Lin and Mo, 2006). Furthermore, the risk for auditors of being prosecuted is 
relatively low. In a legal environment in which there is little threat of costly 
shareholder litigation, auditors have less incentive to avoid audit failures, and 
shareholders have less incentive to discover them (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; 
Lys and Watts, 1994; Palmrose, 1988). 
In short, due to historical conditions, Chinese local governments, local auditors, 
and local government-owned companies have a very close relationship. Under the 
influence of local governments, local auditors are inclined to report favorably on 
local government-owned clients to avoid economic losses, and the ultimate 
ownership of and support from local governments reduces the incentive for listed 
firms to demand high-quality audit reports.  
 
2.2 Variation in institutional development across China 
Although the audit market and audit-client relationship show some common 
characteristics, such as the heavy dependence of local auditors on local governments, 
the ultimate control of most listed companies by governments, and the lenient 
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reporting behavior of local auditors toward local government-owned companies, 
these characteristics may vary across provinces due to the variation in institutional 
development in China. In this thesis, I explore how institutions affect auditor 
reporting behavior in China’s institutional setting, considering in particular the 
government’s involvement in the local economy, credit market development, and the 
legal environment.3 These three aspects are the same institutional factors that are 
investigated by Fan and Wang (2003), and are directly linked with the auditing 
market in China. This section describes the evolution of institutional development in 
these three aspects across the country. 
2.2.1 China’s gradual economic reform strategy 
In 1979, China began to adopt economic reform and initiated the open door 
policy. Unlike adopting drastic changes by Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, China decided to relax price controls, abolish subsidies, sell off state assets, 
and float its currency gradually rather than suddenly. Gradualism has helped to 
maintain economic growth and price stability as China substitutes its command 
economy with the market mechanism (Lin, Cai and Li, 2000).  
The reform started in agriculture between 1978 and 1984 with the 
transformation to individual peasant farming. The initial success in the agricultural 
sector encouraged the state government to extend its reform to the urban industrial 
sector. In late 1984, the decentralization process began, as the control of many SOEs 
was moved from central to local governments (Ying, 1999). Decentralization 
accelerated the demise of central planning, and indirectly pushed the economy 
toward the market (Yusuf, 1994). At the same time, financial reforms transferred the 
responsibility for allocating investment funds from the central government to the 
                                                        
3I also consider institutional development by taking into account the development of non-state 
sectors and development of market in the sensitivity test.  
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decentralized state-owned banking system and allowed the introduction of new 
financial institutions and markets. Simultaneously, more discretion in credit 
allocation was extended to the local branches of the state-owned banks (Brandt and 
Zhu, 2000). 
The coastal development strategy constituted another fundamental dimension of 
the reform. To attract foreign capital and technology, in 1980 four special economic 
zones (SEZs) were established in Guangdong and Fujian (Ying, 1999).4 Local 
governments and enterprises in the SEZs enjoyed flexible economic policies that 
enabled them to be more market oriented. These policies not only encouraged local 
governments to attract foreign capital and develop local infrastructure, but also to 
support enterprises in the zones to further engage in foreign trade. These preferential 
policies boosted the economies of the SEZs. For example, since 1978 Fujian has 
sustained a high rate of economic growth, with its GDP in 1981 increasing by 77.5% 
from the figure for 1978 (Lin, Cai and Li, 2000). After the great success of the SEZs, 
China opened up 14 coastal cities in 1984.5 The rapid economic development in the 
SEZs and coastal cities boosted the confidence of the central government, and in 
1992 China opened up 5 inland cities along the Yangzi River.6 Soon after, 17 inland 
provincial capitals were also opened up.  
In the 20 years of reform, China’s economy has progressed greatly. However, 
the main weakness of the gradualist approach is that it has caused a disparity in the 
economic development across regions. Although in the SEZs and coastal provinces 
the market economy is well developed, in other provinces, and especially those 
inland, administrative planning still heavily influences the local economy (Fan and 
                                                        
4In 1988, Hainan province was added to the SEZs. 
5They are Dalian, QinHuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nan tong, Shanghai, 
Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.  
6They are Wuhu, Jiujiang, Yueyang, Wuhan, and Chongqing.  
 16
Wang, 2003). Based on data from 2000, Fan and Wang (2003) score the eastern, 
central, and western parts of China according to their marketization level. In all five 
dimensions, the eastern part had the highest scores (7.11, 7.58, 8.16, 5.66, and 6.43), 
the western part the lowest scores (5.4, 3.6, 6.39, 2.29, 4.34), and the central part 
intermediate scores (5.47, 4.65, 7.88, 2.59, 4.92).7 This shows the evident disparity 
in marketization level, with the central and western parts lagging behind the eastern 
part of China. 
2.2.2 Heterogeneity of the credit market in China 
According to Tang Suangning, who was Vice President of the China Banking 
Regulatory Committee from April 2003 to June 2007, the credit market has also been 
subject to unbalanced development across regions in China, with rapid development 
in the eastern provinces and relatively slow development elsewhere. The figures for 
company loans are a good illustration of this. By the end of 2005, loans issued in the 
eastern part of China amounted to 11,100 billion RMB, making up almost 60% of the 
total loans in the entire country. In contrast, the central, western, and northeastern 
parts of China received only 2,900 billion RMB, 3,200 billion RMB, and 1,500 
billion RMB, respectively. In addition, the number of banking offices in the eastern 
regions is much larger than that in other regions. The headquarters of the big five 
state-owned banks and twelve commercial banks are all located in the east. As for the 
fourteen foreign financial institutions in China, all of their representative offices are 
located in the eastern regions and most of their branches (177 out of 189) are also in 
the east (Tang, 2006). In the process of reforming the Chinese financial system 
reform, three state-owned banks (the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
Bank of China, and China Construction Bank) transferred their main businesses to 
                                                        
7The five dimensions are the relation between the government and the market, the development 
of non-state sectors, the development of markets, the development of market intermediaries, and 
the legal environment (Wong, Wang and Xia, 2005). 
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the coastal regions. As has been mentioned, during the reform, more discretion in 
credit allocation was extended to the local branches of state-owned banks, and the 
concentration of the business of these state-owned banks further enhanced the 
liquidity of funds within these regions (Brandt and Zhu, 2000). This policy has 
further differentiated the development of the credit market between good and poor 
regions. 
Fan and Wang (2003) compile a sub-index of capital market development level 
based on several ratios for the period 1999 to 2000. These ratios include the ratio of 
deposits taken by non-state-owned financial institutions to deposits taken by all 
financial institutions in a region, the ratio of short-term loans granted to 
non-state-owned companies to the total amount of short-term loans issued by 
financial institutions in that area, and the ratio of foreign capital investment to GDP 
in a certain region. Based on these ratios, they provide the credit market scores for 
different regions, and reveal a great disparity among them. For example, in 2000 
Shanghai had the highest score of 7.94, whereas Qinghai had the lowest score of 
0.35. 
2.2.3 Government involvement in the local economy 
The differing level of government involvement in the local economy is also a 
significant characteristic of China’s institutional heterogeneity. By using the ratio of 
fiscal expenditure to GDP to measure the behavior of governments in terms of 
resource allocation (where the larger the index, the smaller the government 
involvement), Fan and Wang (2003) show the sub-index of eastern regions to be 
twice that of western regions (7.44 vs. 3.02), thus demonstrating the large difference 
between government involvement across China. 
Ni (2002) compares the institutional discrepancy between local governments in 
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areas with a high level of market development and those in regions with a low level 
of market development, and finds that in some coastal cities, such as Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Qingdao, and Ningbo, local governments operate 
efficiently. Ni shows that governments in coastal cities are mainly governed by laws 
and regulations, rather than by discretionary administrative instructions, and that 
local governments in these regions implement market-oriented policies. Furthermore, 
firms in these regions have more opportunity to raise capital, as these cities have 
abundant foreign capital in their markets.  
2.2.4 Disparity in the development of the legal environment in China 
Another important institutional dimension of a country is its legal system. 
Within recent decades, China has achieved great progress in improving its legal 
system. To fulfill its terms of entry into the WTO, the Chinese government has 
reviewed 2,300 laws and regulations relating to the trade in goods and services, and 
intellectual property rights and investment (Xinhua News Agency, 2004). However, 
the legal environment has not developed uniformly across China, and the differences 
in the legal profession between the eastern and western part of China are a good 
example of this. Outstanding lawyers and reputable law firms are mainly located in 
the politically and economically developed centers and coastal cities, whereas in the 
western regions it is quite difficult to gain well-served law consultation, especially in 
rural areas (Chen, 2005). The sub-index of legal environment development compiled 
by Fan and Wang (2003) shows much variation in this aspect. In the index, thirty 
provinces and regions were scored for legal environment development level, where 
the higher the score, the better the legal environment in a region. In 2000, Beijing’s 
legal environment was the best (with the highest score of 7.97), and Hunan the worst 
(with the lowest score of 2.62; see Appendix 2 for more details).  
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In a nutshell, the heterogeneity of the credit market, the difference in 
government involvement in the local economy, and the unbalanced development of 
the legal environment in China together demonstrate that China’s gradual economic 
reform has resulted in a disparity in the development of a market economy and a 
wide variation in institutional development across provinces. I expect this 
institutional disparity to bring about differences in auditor behavior in China. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Hypotheses 
 
As discussed in the foregoing chapter, Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) find the 
phenomenon that local audit firms in China are lenient toward local 
government-owned companies. However, I do not expect this phenomenon to be 
uniform across the whole country. In this chapter, I develop the research hypotheses 
based on the analysis of institutional variation in Chapter 2 and relevant conclusions 
drawn from Chinese audit market research. This chapter explains how institutional 
heterogeneity, including government involvement in the local economy, the local 
credit market, and the local legal environment, affect auditor reporting behavior in 
China.  
 
3.1 Institutional influences on initial auditor opinion  
Previous studies (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Fan and 
Wong, 2002; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2003) have shown that accounting standards 
are not the only determinant of reporting behavior, but that economic and political 
variables profoundly affect financial reporting practice. For example, the 
improvement of shareholder protection, which characterizes a country’s corporate 
governance environment, can enhance the quality of accounting information (Hung, 
2000). In an examination of the institutional settings of four East Asian countries and 
regions (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand), Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) 
find that in markets with a more developed institutional environment in which there 
is a larger and more diverse base of individual shareholders and bondholders, 
information asymmetry is more efficiently resolved through public disclosure. They 
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argue that there is therefore a greater demand for quality auditing in countries with a 
better institutional environment. These results suggest that shareholders and 
bondholders potentially influence audit behavior. 
In this thesis, I explore how institutions affect auditor reporting behavior in the 
institutional setting of China. China began its economic reforms in 1978, one of the 
major goals of which was to allow local governments to actively promote economic 
growth in their region. To fulfill this objective, the Chinese central government 
carried out a series of decentralization reforms, including allowing provinces to 
allocate and manage their own economic resources, decentralizing fiscal control to 
local governments, and providing political incentives to government officials to 
promote local economic growth (Huang, 1996; Li and Zhou, 2005; Qian and Xu, 
1993). Under such incentives, local officers in different provinces compete in various 
economic dimensions, such as the number of firms listed on the stock exchange. To 
avoid firms being delisted from the stock markets and to make IPOs more successful, 
local governments exert a significant influence over auditor reporting behavior in 
their jurisdictions by threatening not to use the services of the auditor in question for 
the companies that they control (Wong, Wang and Xia, 2005). Although local 
governments undertook a series of measures in the 1990s to terminate their 
sponsorship of audit firms to increase auditor independence, some local governments 
still influence the activities of audit firms, which in turn potentially influence auditor 
independence (Chan, Lin and Mo, 2006). Thus, because of their deep involvement in 
the local economy and their historical relationship with local auditors, local 
governments have an adverse impact on the auditor independence. 
The prevalent government ownership of SOEs in China also influences auditor 
reporting behavior. Chan, Lin and Zhang (2007) relate ownership structure to 
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mandatory external audits in the context of a concentrated ownership in China, and 
find that a decrease in the number of shares held by government and a corresponding 
increase in the number of institutionally held shares has led to a general increase in 
the demand for higher-quality audits in China’s stock market. Park and Luo (2001) 
argue that in China most listed companies are ultimately owned or controlled by 
local governments, and thus the survival of firms often depends on their personal or 
organizational networking with such governments. This means that local auditors in 
China are under pressure from local governments that have both the incentive and the 
ability to protect the companies that they own. 
The level of development of the credit market also affects audit behavior. Due to 
government control, most branches of foreign banks in China are located in coastal 
regions, where there are more financial institutions than in inland regions (Tang 
2006).8 Capital is tightly controlled by the state, and the government controls access 
to both loans from state-owned banks and equity capital. In other words, as 
state-owned banks issue loans to SOEs under pressure from local governments, their 
incentive to pursue high-quality audits and to challenge the accuracy of financial 
reports is low. Jin and Qian (1998) find that in areas with a lower level of market 
development, firms that are more affiliated with local governments enjoy more credit 
advantages. I therefore expect that in poor institutional regions in which the credit 
market is less developed, the demand for high audit quality will be lower.  
The legal environment is an essential institutional factor that also affects the 
development of a country’s audit market and auditor behavior. The literature suggests 
that a poor legal environment significantly weakens the demand for and supply of 
                                                        
8Before China’s entry into the WTO, the Chinese government carried out some measures to 
protect local credit markets. For example, to limit the industry shock from foreign financial 
institutions, most private or foreign banks were only allowed to locate themselves in coastal areas. 
Only after December 2006 did China eliminate all limitations on locality and currency businesses 
for foreign banks to fulfill its WTO entry commitments.  
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quality audits, and therefore decreases the quality of audit reports (Ball, Robin and 
Wu 2003; Choi and Wong, 2005). The NERI index (2001) (Fan and Wang, 2003) 
shows China’s legal environment to be neither well nor uniformly developed. Fan 
and Wang (2003) rank provinces in this dimension according to their development 
level, and find Beijing to have the highest score (7.97) and Hunan the lowest score 
(2.62). In provinces or regions with a more mature legal environment, those who use 
audit reports may have more channels through which to protect their rights, and 
therefore the cost of collusion between auditors and clients is likely to be high. In 
contrast, in provinces or regions with a poor legal environment, auditors may well 
collude with clients to obtain economic benefits because of the low cost of litigation.  
This thesis examines how institutions affect auditor reporting behavior in China 
by conducting research on the combined influence of government involvement in the 
local economy, and the development level of the local credit market and legal 
environment on auditor reporting behavior. Examining how and to what extent a 
single dimension influences auditor reporting behavior cannot capture the overall 
picture in China. Therefore, I did not study the influence of the above-mentioned 
three dimensions separately. Based on the foregoing analysis of the influence of the 
institutional environment on auditing in China and the heterogeneity of institutions 
across regions, I expect that in poor institutional regions in which government 
involvement in the local economy is heavy and the credit market and legal 
environment are less developed, local auditors are more likely to issue unqualified 
audit opinions to local government-owned companies. My first two hypotheses are 
therefore as follows. 
H1a: Compared with non-local auditors operating in poor institutional regions, local 
auditors in these regions are more likely to issue clean audit opinions to local 
government-owned companies, ceteris paribus (refer to Figure 1). 
 
 24
H1b: Compared with local auditors in good institutional regions, local auditors in 
poor institutional regions are more likely to issue clean opinions to local 
government-owned companies, ceteris paribus (refer to Figure 2). 
 
3.2 Institutional influences on subsequent auditor opinions 
Previous studies suggest that switching auditors may reduce the probability of 
subsequent audit qualification (Magee and Tseng, 1990). Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) 
focus on companies with qualified opinions in China to determine whether they 
succeeded in obtaining a clean opinion after switching to a local auditor, and find 
that local auditors that are subject to greater political pressure from local 
governments are more likely to issue a favorable audit report to local 
government-owned companies that were previously qualified and switched auditor. 
However, they do not consider the influence of institutional variation in China on 
subsequent audit opinions. To complement their study, I test whether the disparity in 
institutional environment in China affects subsequent audit opinions.  
As explained in Section 3.1, because of the prevalent government ownership in 
SOEs and the close relationship between local governments and local auditors, 
Chinese local governments exert pressure on auditors in their jurisdictions to report 
favorably on clients that they own. Moreover, as the legal environment is generally 
not well developed in China, the litigation risk for Chinese local auditors is low, 
which leads them to collude with state-owned clients. However, as there is disparity 
in the institutional environment across different provinces in China, I expect that in 
poor institutional areas in which the involvement of local governments in the local 
economy is heavier, the credit market less developed, and the legal environment 
poorer, opinion shopping is more likely to be successful. Specifically, I expect audit 
firms in poor institutional regions to be more likely to issue subsequent favorable 
audit reports to local government-owned companies who were previously qualified 
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and switched auditor. I test the following hypotheses to provide empirical evidence 
for this argument. 
H2a: In poor institutional regions, local auditors are more likely than non-local 
auditors to issue a subsequent clean audit opinion to previously qualified local 
government-owned companies that switched auditors. 
 
H2b: Compared with local auditors in good institutional regions, local auditors in 
poor institutional regions are more likely to issue subsequent clean opinions to 
local government-owned companies, ceteris paribus. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Method 
 
This chapter describes the data collection and sample selection, and develops 
three multiple regression models for the empirical testing of the hypotheses on the 
relationship between (initial and subsequent) audit opinions and auditor locality and 
the ownership type of client firms in regions with differently developed institutional 
environments. 
 
4.1 Data collection 
I collected data on the audit opinion types, auditor identity, and client firm 
characteristics from the 1996 to 2005 annual reports of the companies listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. These data were mainly taken from the 
WIND Information Database, which is a leading integrated service provider of 
financial data in mainland China. I also used public information from one of the three 
securities newspapers in China (China Securities News, Shanghai Securities News, 
and Securities Times) as a supplement when the necessary information was not 
available from the WIND Information Database.  
The final sample data consists of 8,039 firm-year observations after the 
exclusion of firms with missing data, firms that also issued B-shares or H-shares, 
financial institutions and Tibetan firms (see Table 1).9 In China, listed firms that 
                                                        
9B-shares are issued by companies incorporated in mainland China, and are traded in the 
mainland B-share markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen). B-shares are quoted in foreign currencies. 
In the past, only foreigners were allowed to trade B-shares, but since March 2001 Chinese 
residents have also been allowed to trade B-shares with legal foreign currency accounts. H-shares 
are issued by companies incorporated in mainland China, and are listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.  
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issue B-shares are required to prepare an additional set of financial statements for 
foreign investors in accordance with the International Accounting Standards, and 
must be audited by an international audit firm. Companies issuing H-shares are also 
required to prepare financial statements in accordance with the International 
Accounting Standards. Therefore, the auditor choice, financial characteristics, and 
regulatory environments of these firms are different from those of firms that issue 
only A-shares. Financial institutions are excluded from the sample because the nature 
of their business and financial reporting items are different from those of other listed 
companies. I exclude 40 firm-year observations from Tibet because there are no local 
auditors in the observation period, and thus these firms were only able to choose a 
non-local auditor.  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
To measure the breadth of institutional variation in China, I classified China’s 
30 provinces into “good” and “poor” institutional regions according to the NERI 
index (2001) of Fan and Wang (2003), which ranks the marketization level of 30 
provinces or regions of China. The NERI index (2001) reports on the relative process 
of marketization in each region in China, and captures the institutional characteristics 
of China’s 30 regions in five dimensions. I use three of the five dimensions that are 
directly relevant to my study to measure institutional heterogeneity across regions. 
The first dimension is credit market development, which is measured by the 
percentage of deposits taken by non-state financial institutions and the percentage of 
short-term loans granted to the non-state sector. The second dimension of the index is 
government decentralization, which is based on government spending as a 
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percentage of GDP, the total number of local government-owned companies in a 
province, and the volume of government administrative regulations. The larger this 
index, the smaller the government involvement in the economy. The third dimension 
is the legal environment index, which measures the number of lawyers as a 
percentage of the population of the province (see Appendix 2 for more details). 
I add up the scores of these three indices for each province, and then calculate 
the median score for each of the 30 provinces or regions and cities.10 Based on the 
median value of 16.27, I categorize the first 14 provinces with marks that are above 
the median as regions with a good institutional environment, and the last 16 
provinces as regions with a poor institutional environment. According to this 
classification, “good regions” include Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, 
Shandong, Hebei, Tianjin, Beijing, Anhui, Liaoning, Chongqing, Hainan, Fujian, and 
Jilin (上海、浙江、江蘇、廣東、山東、河北、天津、北京、安徽、遼甯、重慶、
海南、福建、吉林), and “poor regions” include Guangxi, Henan, Jiangxi, Yunnan, 
Guizhou, Gansu, Shanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Ningxia, Sichuan, Neimenggu, Shananxi, 
Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, and Qinghai (廣西、河南、江西、雲南、貴州、甘
肅、山西、湖北、湖南、寧夏、四川、內蒙古、陝西、黑龍江、新疆、青海).11 
                                                        
10 In this thesis, the three dimensions of the index (i.e. credit market development, government 
decentralization, and legal environment) are assumed to have an equal weight in influencing the 
institutional environment. This is because I intend to study how institutions as a whole affect 
auditor reporting behavior (rather than to study each dimension’s separate effect). Further, these 
three dimensions are closely related to each other and there is no an objective way of measuring 
the relative importance of each dimension. Therefore, I treat the three dimensions as having an 
equal weight. Nevertheless, classifications of “good” and “poor” regions based on the three 
indices separately are also used in robust tests. As the results are mixed, no clear conclusion can 
be drawn. 
11Appendix 2 shows the median and mean values of the sums to be 16.27 and 16.07, respectively. 
Thus Guangxi and Henan provinces have the median and just above the mean value. I do not 
categorize these two provinces into good regions because they have been officially classified as 
being in the less-developed central and western provinces that require more subsidies from the 
central government (West Development Office of State Council of China, 2001; Henan 
Government Work Report, 2007). In the robust tests, I classify these two provinces as good 
regions but find the results insensitive to this re-classification. 
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The NERI index is a series of continuous indices, and by 2007, four NERI indices 
had been published.12 I choose the marks in the three dimensions (credit market 
development, government decentralization, and legal environment) that were 
compiled based on the 2000 data to rank the 30 provinces. As the year 2000 is in the 
middle of my study period of 1996 to 2005, I expect the data in 2000 to be 
representative of the classification throughout the study period. In fact, although the 
rankings of certain provinces changed in different periods, there are roughly no 
changes in the provinces in the good and poor groups after 2000.13  
In classifying audit opinions, I follow previous empirical studies (Chan, Lin and 
Mo, 2000; Chen, Chen and Su, 2001; DeFond, Wong and Li, 2000) that define 
“qualified” opinions as including unqualified opinions with an explanatory paragraph, 
and qualified, disclaimer, and adverse opinions. I identify the type of share 
ownership of listed firms (local versus non-local government-owned companies) 
according to the Wind Information Database, which provides detailed information 
about the top ten shareholders of listed firms, such as the name, the number and 
percentage of shares held, and the ultimate owner of each of the shareholders. For the 
data not provided by Wind, I refer to other information sources, such as securities 
newspapers and company websites, to determine share ownership. Following the 
criteria in previous studies (Chan, Lin and Mo., 2006; La Porta, Lopez-de Silanos, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1999), I choose 20% as the cutoff for an ownership type: that is, 
a listed firm is defined as a local government-owned company if its largest 
                                                        
12The NERI (2000) published in 2001 was compiled based on the data from 1997 to 1999; the 
NERI (2001) published in 2003 was compiled based on the data from 1999 to 2000; and the 
NERI (2004) published in 2004 was compiled based on the data from 2001 to 2002.  
13The rankings in 1999 and 2000 are the same. In 2001 and 2002, Sichuan (四川) became a 
“good” region, and Jilin (吉林) a “poor” region. In 2003, 2004, and 2005, Sichuan (四川) and 
Henan (河南) became “good” regions, whereas Jilin (吉林) and Hihan (海南) became “poor” 
regions. There were no other changes in the “good” and “poor” categories in these three years. 
Nevertheless, I conduct a sensitivity test in Chapter 5 according to the rankings in 2001 and 
2003. 
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shareholder is a local government entity that owns at least 20% of the total shares 
outstanding. 
As illustrated earlier, I follow the definition of “local auditor” used by Wong, 
Wang and Xia (2005) that an audit firm is considered to be local if the firm is located 
in the same jurisdiction (province or equivalent in China) as the client. In 2000, the 
Chinese government began to encourage the merger of small audit firms, and some 
auditors from two or more regions merged to form a new auditor. In this case, I adopt 
the classification method of Wong, Wang and Xia (2005) that treats the original 
registry regions of the auditors engaged in the merger and the new registry region 
after the merger as the registry regions of the new audit firm. For example, if a listed 
firm hires a new auditor that was created from the merger of several auditors from 
different regions, then this firm is considered to be located in the same jurisdiction as 
the auditor if it is located in any one of the registry regions of the new auditor.  
 
4.2 Specification of the logistic regression models 
To test the hypotheses, four logistic regression models are applied. Models (1), 
(2), (3), and (4) respectively test H1a, H1b, H2a, H2b.  
Opit= 0λ + 1λ LocAudit+ 2λ LocGovit+ 3λ LocAudit*LocGovit+ 4λ AuditSZit 
+ 5λ ROEit+ 6λ Clientit+ 7λ TD/TAit+ 8λ Cur_ratit+ 9λ Recivit 
+ 10λ Invit+ 11λ Lossi2+ itε              (1) 
 
Opit= 0β + 1β INSTit+ 2β LocGovit+ 3β INSTit*LocGovit+ 4β AuditSZit 
+ 5β ROEit+ 6β Clientit+ 7β TD/TAit+ 8β Cur_ratit+ 9β Recivit 
+ 10β Invit+ 11β Lossi2+ itε              (2) 
 
Sub_Opit= 0α + 1α LocAudit+ 2α LocGovit+ 3α LocAudit*LocGovit+ 4α AuditSZit 
+ 5α ROEit+ 6α Clientit+ 7α TD/TAit+ 8α Cur_ratit+ 9α Recivit 
+ 10α Invit+ 11α Lossi2+ itε             (3) 
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Sub_Opit= 0θ + 1θ INSTit+ 2θ LocGovit+ 3θ INSTit*LocGovit+ 4θ AuditSZit 
+ 5θ ROEit+ 6θ Clientit+ 7θ TD/TAit+ 8θ Cur_ratit+ 9θ Recivit 
+ 10θ Invit+ 11θ Lossi2+ itε             (4) 
 
where i denotes the sample firm and t denotes the year in the sample period. 
In model (1), the dependent variable Opit is classified as either qualified (= 1) or 
unqualified (= 0). LocAudit = 1 if the auditor is local, and 0 otherwise. LocGovit= 1 if 
a listed company is a local government-owned company, and 0 otherwise. The 
interaction term LocAudit*LocGovit=1 represents a local government-owned 
company that is audited by a local auditor. I follow the analysis of Chan, Lin and Mo 
(2006) and use this interaction term to test the institutional influence of the local 
government on audit opinions. The sign of the coefficients of the interaction term 
(i.e. 3λ ) is expected to be negative. 
In model (2), the sub-sample consists of clients that are audited by local auditors. 
The dependent variable (Opit) is as previously defined in model (1). The explanatory 
variable of interest in model (2) is INSTit (Institution). INSTit = 1 if an auditor is 
located in a poor institutional region, and 0 otherwise. LocGovit is as previously 
defined. I use the interaction term INSTit*LocGovit to test the difference in political 
influence in different institutional environments. INSTit*LocGovit= 1 represents a 
local government-owned company in a poor institutional region that is audited by a 
local auditor. I expect this interaction term (i.e. 3β ) to be negatively associated with 
the dependent variable. 
The sub-sample in model (3) comprises qualified-and-switched companies.14 
The dependent variable Sub_Opit= 1 if a client gained a qualified audit opinion in 
year t after switching, and 0 otherwise. In this model, I compare the companies that 
                                                        
14 I did not study the four switching directions separately due to the concern of the sample size. 
The number of observations switching from “good” to “poor” regions, from “poor” to “good”, 
from “good” to “good” and from “poor” to “poor” are 77, 88, 586 and 63, respectively. 
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received qualified audits in year t-1 and then switched to auditors in poor 
institutional regions in year t with the companies that received qualified audits in 
year t-1 and then switched to auditors in good institutional regions in year t. Chan, 
Lin and Mo (2006) test the influence of locality on subsequent auditor opinion. They 
argue that compared with non-local auditors, local auditors are more likely to issue a 
subsequent clean opinion to local government-owned companies that were 
previously qualified and switched auditor. I focus on the subsequent reporting 
behavior of local auditors in regions with different institutional environment. The 
interaction term LocAudit*LocGovit= 1 represents a local government-owned 
company that is audited by a local auditor, for which I expect the coefficient to be 
significantly negative.  
The sub-sample in model (4) comprises qualified companies that switched to 
local auditors in either “poor” regions or “good” regions. The dependent variable 
(Sub_Opit) is as previously defined in model (3). In this model, I compare the 
companies that were qualified in year t-1 and then switched to local auditors in poor 
institutional regions in year t with the companies that were qualified in year t-1 and 
then switched to local auditors in good institutional regions in year t. The 
explanatory variables LocGovit, INSTit.and INSTit*LocGovit are as previously 
defined in model (1) and (2). I expect the interaction term INSTit*LocGovit to be 
negatively correlated with the dependent variable. 
 
4.3 Control variables in the models 
In the three models, I use AuditSZit to control for the effect of auditor size on 
audit opinions, where AuditSZit= 1 if an audit firm is a top ten audit firm, based on 
total client assets. DeFond, Wong and Li (2000) find that companies audited by the 
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top ten audit firms tend to be more likely to receive qualified opinions. I expect 
AuditSZit to be positively associated with the dependent variable. 
Also following previous studies (Chen, Chen and Su, 2001; DeFond, Wong and 
Li, 2000; Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Wilkins, 1997), I use Clientit, ROEit, TD/TAit, 
Cur_ratit, Recivit, Invit, Lossi2 to measure the financial status of listed companies. 
Specifically, I use Clientit (the logarithm of the year-end total assets of a client) to 
proxy for client size and ROEit (net income over year-end total owner equity) to 
measure client profitability level. I expect the coefficients of Clientit and ROEit to be 
negatively associated with the dependent variable. In addition, TD/TAit (total debt 
over total assets) and Cur_ratit (current assets over current liabilities) are used to 
measure the liquidity level of the sample companies. I expect TD/TAit to be 
positively associated with the dependent variable. Some studies (e.g., Chen, Chen 
and Su, 2001) suggest that the current ratio has a negative impact on audit opinion, 
but other studies take the opposite view. For example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and 
Servaes (2003) find cross-country evidence to suggest that firms hold more cash in 
countries with greater agency problems, which may lead to qualified audit opinions. 
In other words, a high current ratio might lead to qualified audit opinions, rather than 
unqualified opinions. As a result of the contradictory findings, I do not predict the 
sign of the coefficient of the variable Cur_ratit. To measure a company’s management 
ability of accounts receivable and inventory, I include Recivit (accounts receivable to 
total assets) and Invit (inventory to total assets) in the models. The dummy variable 
Lossi2 is used to control for the effect of delisting avoidance incentives on the 
probability of receiving a qualified opinion (Chan, Lin and Mo, 2006), where Lossi2 
= 1 if a listed company made losses in year t-1 and year t-2, and 0 otherwise. As 
Chinese regulations require listed companies to be de-listed if they report losses for 
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three consecutive years, I expect companies reporting losses in the two consecutive 
years preceding the observation year to be more likely to manage earnings, which in 
turn could lead to the receipt of a qualified report (Chen, Chen and Su, 2001). 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Results 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the hypothesis testing, including 
the descriptive statistics, univariate tests, and multiple regression tests. The results of 
the various sensitivity tests are also reported.  
 
5.1 Empirical results for Hypothesis 1a 
Table 2 (Panel A) presents the descriptive statistics on client firm characteristics 
partitioned by institutional region, client ownership, and auditor locale. For each 
category in Panel A, I winsorize the data at 1% and 99% to reduce the impact of 
outliers and data errors. The data out of the range 1%-99% are transferred into the 
relevant value at 1% and 99% respectively. Panels B, C, and D provide relevant 
comparisons of financial status for the sample firms used in the testing of H1a (good 
regions), H1a (poor regions), and H1b (local auditors in both good and poor regions), 
respectively. Panel B shows that local government-owned companies audited by 
local auditors in good regions have significantly larger total assets, lower current 
ratio and lower receivable level than those audited by non-local auditors. There are 
no significant differences in other financial ratios, such as ROE, leverage (TD/TA), 
inventory to total assets (Inv), and financial losses (Loss). 
The comparison of client firm characteristics in Panel C indicates that, on 
average, local government-owned clients that are audited by local auditors in poor 
regions have significantly higher ROE, larger total assets, lower leverage (TD/TA), 
higher current ratio, and less likely to make consecutive losses than those local 
government-owned companies audited by non-local auditors in poor regions. 
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Panel D provides descriptive statistics on the difference in financial status of 
local government-owned companies audited by local auditors in good versus poor 
regions. Local government-owned companies audited by local auditors in good 
regions have lower ROE, larger total assets, higher leverage (TD/TA), lower current 
ratio, higher inventory ratio than those companies in poor regions.  
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the univariate test of auditor reporting behavior in 
different institutional environments. Local auditors in poor regions report more 
favorably than non-local auditors towards local government-owned companies (94% 
vs. 82%). However, the figures in good institutional regions show no such tendency 
(87% vs. 87%).  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for H1a. Both models are 
significant at the 0.01 level. Consistent with my hypothesis, the interaction term 
LocAudit*LocGovit is significant in Panel B (p-value = 0.000), which suggests that, 
compared with non-local auditors in poor institutional regions, local auditors in these 
regions are more likely to issue clean audit opinions to local government-owned 
companies, ceteris paribus. However, this phenomenon is not evident in the good 
institutional regions. In short, institutional heterogeneity does have an independent 
influence on auditor behavior across China.  
The results for the control variables are also as predicted. The sign of the 
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coefficient of ROEit in Panel B is significantly negatively related to audit opinion, 
which suggests that in poor regions, firms with a higher ROE ratio are more likely to 
receive unqualified audit opinions. The coefficients of Clientit in Panel A and Panel B 
are both negatively related to the dependent variable, which suggests that a large firm 
is more likely to receive clean audit opinions. The coefficients of the variables 
TD/TAit and Lossi2 are positively related with the dependent variable, which 
indicates that a firm with a higher debt ratio and that reports a loss in the two years 
before the reporting year is inclined to receive a qualified audit opinion. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
5.2 Empirical results for hypothesis 1b 
I further analyze the opinions of local auditors toward local government-owned 
companies in good and poor institutional regions. The results of the chi-square test in 
Table 5 shows that local auditors in poor institutional regions are more likely to issue 
clean opinions to local government-owned companies than to non-local 
government-owned companies (94% vs. 89%), but in good institutional regions, local 
auditors do not exhibit this tendency (87% vs. 89%). 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
Table 6 presents the logistic regression results for Model (2) (H1b), which are 
significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient of the interaction term INSTit*LocGovit 
is significantly negatively associated with auditor opinion at the 0.01 level. 
Consistent with the univariate test results, the results show that, ceteris paribus, local 
 38
auditors in poor institutional regions are more likely to issue clean opinions to local 
government owned companies than local auditors in good institutional regions.15 
The coefficients of the control variables ROEit, Clientit, TD/TAit and Lossi2 all have 
the predicted sign and are significant at the 0.1, 0.01, 0.01, and 0.05 level.  
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
5.3 Empirical results for hypothesis 2a 
Table 7 provides univariate test on the subsequent opinions after clients 
switched to auditors in good or poor institutional regions. The results show that local 
auditors in poor regions are more likely than non-local auditors to issue unqualified 
audit opinions to local government-owned clients, who were qualified and then 
switched to auditors in poor regions (87% vs. 73%).  
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
Table 8 presents the logistic regression results for model (3). The sub-sample in 
this table is companies that were qualified in year t-1 and then switched to auditors in 
poor or good institutional regions in year t. The interaction term LocAudit*LocGovit 
is insignificant in Panel A, but significant in Panel B, which implies that local 
                                                        
15 I do not investigate the difference in the behavior of non-local auditors toward local 
government-owned clients in good and poor regions, as I do not expect a significant behavioral 
difference among non-local auditors. Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) reveal that, compared with 
non-local auditors, local auditors are more inclined to report favorably on companies controlled 
by local governments. In China, non-local auditors face smaller political pressure from local 
governments and have less of an economic dependence on local clients than local auditors (Chan, 
Lin and Mo, 2006). I therefore expect institutions to have little influence on non-local auditors in 
China. Nevertheless, I still use the logistic regression of Model (2) to test the difference in the 
behavior of non-local auditors in good and poor regions. Table 13 presents the results, which 
indicate that non-local auditors in poor regions are indifferent from those in good regions in the 
extent to which they issue clean audit opinions to local government-owned companies.  
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auditors in poor regions are inclined to issue clean subsequent opinions to local 
government-owned companies that switched auditor. Panel A of the table shows that 
the coefficients of the variables Clientit and TD/TAit have the expected sign and are 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
5.4 Empirical results for hypothesis 2b 
Table 9 provides univariate test on the subsequent opinions of those companies 
that switched to local auditors in good or poor institutional regions. The results show 
that local government-owned companies are more likely to receive a subsequent 
clean opinion when they switched to a successor auditor resided in poor institutional 
regions ( 2χ = 0.219, p = 0.640 vs. 2χ =6.229, p = 0.013). 
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
Table 10 presents the logistic regression results for model (4). The results show 
that the interaction term INSTit*LocGovit is insignificant. This suggests that 
institutions have little power in explaining the likelihood of issuing subsequent audit 
opinions to local government-owned companies by local auditors. The coefficients of 
the control variables ROEit, Clientit, TD/TAit and Lossi2 all have the predicted signs 
and are significant at the 0.1 level.  
 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
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5.5 Sensitivity tests 
To check the robustness of the regression results, I conduct the following 
sensitivity tests. First, I retest the main hypotheses (H1a and H1b) by reclassifying 
the “good” and “poor” institutional regions on the basis of the median and mean 
values of the index, based on Fang and Wang (2003). Appendix 2 shows the median 
and mean values of the sums to be 16.27 and 16.07, respectively. Guangxi and Henan 
provinces are the median provinces, and their values are also closest to the mean 
value. Table 11 reports the robust test on H1a and shows that classifying Henan and 
Guangxi as good regions makes the interaction term of LocAudit*LocGovit 
negatively significant at the 0.1 level for the good region sample. However, Table 12 
shows that the interaction term of INSTit*LocGovit is negatively significant, 
consistent with the main results, 
In order to eliminate the effect of “neutral” regions, such as Henan and Guangxi, 
I classify the “good” and “poor” regions by excluding the middle 10 provinces in the 
robustness test. In this case, good and poor institutional regions include only the top 
10 and bottom 10 provinces.16 Again, the results of running the robustness tests are 
consistent with the main results. 
Third, I test the effect of the three indices separately, by classifying “good” and 
poor regions according to the “credit market index”, “government decentralization 
index” and “legal environment index” of 30 provinces.17 For the classification by 
                                                        
16 “Good regions” include Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shandong, Hebei, Tianjin, 
Beijing, Anhui, Liaoning (上海、浙江、江蘇、廣東、山東、河北、天津、北京、安徽、遼甯), 
and “Poor regions” include Shanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Ningxia, Sichuan, Neimenggu, Shananxi, 
Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, and Qinghai (山西、湖北、湖南、寧夏、四川、內蒙古、陝西、
黑龍江、新疆、青海). 
17  According to the “credit market index”, “Good regions” include Shanghai, Shandong, 
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hebei, Guangdong, Chongqing, Liaoning, Hunan, Shananxi, Henan, Jilin, 
Tianjin, Hainan (上海, 山東, 浙江, 江蘇, 河北, 廣東, 重慶, 遼寧, 湖南, 陝西, 河南, 吉林, 
天津, 海南), and “poor regions” include Anhui, Guizhou, Yunnan,Gansu, Jiangxi, Ningxia, 
Hubei, Beijing, Fujian, Guangxi, Neimenggu, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Qinghai 
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“credit market index”, the results of hypothesis 1a are consistent with the main 
results, however, the results of hypothesis 1b are inconsistent. For the classification 
by “government decentralization index” and “legal environment index”, the results of 
hypotheses 1a are inconsistent with the main results, and the results of hypothesis 1b 
are consistent. Therefore, no clear conclusions can be made from these results. 
Finally, I reclassify the “good” and “poor” institutional regions according to 
different versions of the NERI Index. The NERI Index of Marketization of China’s 
provinces is a continuous index compiled four times by Fan and Wang in 2001, 2003, 
2004 and 2006. The NERI (2000) published in 2001 was compiled based on the data 
from 1997 to 1999, the NERI (2001) published in 2003 was compiled based on the 
data from 1999 to 2000, the NERI (2004) published in 2004 was compiled based on 
the data from 2001 to 2002, and the NERI (2006) published in 2007 was compiled 
based on the data from 2001 to 2005. Fan and Wang (2003, 2007) point out that, in 
the main, the changes in marketization ranking for the 30 regions were small from 
1999 to 2005. In the main tests, I classify the different institutional groups on the 
basis of the NERI Index in 2001 (version 2003). To avoid potential bias in 
classifying the good and poor regions by using only one year’s NERI Index, I refer to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(安徽, 貴州, 雲南, 甘肅, 江西, 寧夏, 湖北, 北京, 福建, 廣西, 內蒙古, 黑龍江, 山西, 新
疆, 四川, 青海).  
According to the “government decentralization index”, “Good regions” include Zhejiang, Jiangsu, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, Shanghai, Anhui, Sichuan, Shandong, Hebei, Fujian, Yunnan, 
Beijing, Jiangxi, Liaoning (浙江、江蘇、廣東、廣西、 重慶、上海、安徽、四川、山東、河
北、福建、雲南、北京、江西、遼寧), and “poor regions” include Tianjin, Hainan, Gansu, Hunan, 
Jilin, Henan, Guizhou, Shananxi, Hubei, Shanxi, Ningxia, Heilongjiang, Neimenggu, Xinjiang, 
Qinghai (天津、海南、甘肅、湖南、吉林、河南、貴州、陝西、湖北、山西、寧夏、黑龍
江、內蒙古、新疆、青海). 
According to the “legal environment index”, “Good regions” include Beijing, Guangdong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Hainan, Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jilin, Shandong, Liaoning, Shanxi, 
Heilongjiang, Anhui, Ningxia (北京、廣東、上海、天津、海南、福建、江蘇、浙江、吉林、
山東、遼寧、山西、黑龍江、安徽、寧夏), and “poor regions” include Hebei, Hubei, Henan, 
Neimenggu, Guangxi, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Qinghai, Guizhou, Xinjiang, Gansu, Yunnan, Chongqing, 
Shananxi, Hunan (河北、湖北、河南、內蒙古、廣西、江西、四川、青海、貴州、新疆、甘
肅、雲南、重慶、陝西、湖南). 
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the other versions of the NERI Index to sort the good institutional regions from the 
poor regions. In retesting the hypotheses on the basis of the different NERI Index 
versions, I find the robust tests results to be consistent with the main tests.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Limitations 
 
This chapter summarizes the main results of this empirical study, and discusses 
several limitations and possible areas for future research. 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
This study examines how institutions affect auditor reporting behavior by taking 
advantage of China’s institutional setting, in which the heterogeneity of institutions 
exists across different provinces or regions. The use of within-country, firm-specific 
data in this study overcomes some of the limitations of cross-country studies, such as 
a small sample size, endogeneity, and correlated omitted variables. In addition, my 
study supplements the findings of previous studies (Chan, Lin and Mo, 2006; Wong, 
Wang and Xia, 2005) on the relationship between institutional factors and China’s 
auditing market. Chan, Lin and Mo (2006) argue that audit opinions in China are 
affected by the political and economic influence of local governments, arguing that 
politically vulnerable local auditors have an incentive to report leniently and 
favorably on local government-owned companies. Wong, Wang and Xia (2006) find 
that institutional disparity can result in different incentives for the SOEs to pursue 
high-quality audits, and that small local auditors are more lenient toward 
government-owned clients. However, they do not provide any analysis or evidence as 
to whether such leniency holds uniformly across China. I expect the situation to be 
complicated in China’s unique institutional setting, and propose that in regions in 
which the institutional environment is less developed, local auditors are more likely 
than non-local auditors to compromise their independence by issuing more 
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unqualified audit opinions to please their local government-owned clients. Further, 
compared with local auditors in good institutional regions, local auditors in poor 
institutional regions are more likely to issue an unqualified opinion to local 
government-owned companies. Finally, I test the influence of institutions on 
subsequent audit opinions. I expect that for qualified companies that switched to 
auditors in a poor institutional region, local auditors are more likely than non-local 
auditors to issue a subsequent clean audit opinion to local government-owned clients.  
Using a sample of firm-year data covering the period from 1996 to 2005, my 
empirical results support all of the hypotheses. I find that in regions with a poor 
institutional environment in which the level of local government involvement in the 
local economy is high, the development of the local credit market is immature, and 
the legal environment is poor, local auditors are more likely than non-local auditors 
to sacrifice their independence.  
A policy implication of this study is that establishing auditing standards and 
restructuring the auditing industry alone are not enough to develop an independent 
audit market: institutional development is also a basic condition for formulating a 
high-quality auditing profession. Especially in provinces or regions with a poor 
institutional environment, lessening the involvement of local government in the 
economy and in business activities, developing the credit market, and perfecting the 
legal environment may help to improve auditor independence. 
Overall, the evidence that is reported in this study helps give a better 
understanding of auditor reporting behavior in China. Moreover, it also provides 
useful information for China’s ongoing economic reform, demonstrating that 
unbalanced institutional development profoundly affects the accounting profession, 
and should not be neglected in the next step of the reform process.  
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6.2 Limitations and suggestions for future studies 
The chief limitation of this empirical analysis is that the classification of the 
regions according to their level of institutional development is mainly based on the 
research of Fan and Wang (2003), who admit that their results may suffer from the 
unavailability of data from some provinces. However, they argue that the NERI 
index (2001) captures the main aspects of the situation in China, and I therefore 
expect the results in this thesis to reflect the general circumstances in China.  
Besides, I assume that the three indices (i.e. credit market index, government 
decentralization index, and legal environment index) used in this thesis have equal 
weight in influencing auditor reporting behavior. This is a limitation of this thesis, 
since there is no objective way of measuring whether one index dominates another 
and whether some indices have no effect at all. It is worthwhile to develop further 
research based on more accurate institutional classification.  
I believe that several research issues deserve further consideration as the 
institutional environment of China keeps improving. For example, as China’s reform 
moves forward, the central government is trying to narrow the development gap 
between the eastern and western regions, and to establish a better developed 
institutional environment for businesses. On January 1st, 2007, China began to 
implement new accounting standards that are based on the International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS). However, whether the application of the IFRS will 
narrow the disparity in auditor behavior in different regions is an empirical issue.  
This thesis demonstrates that auditor reporting behavior can be different within 
a country due to institutional heterogeneity. Future research on this issue using data 
from other transition economies would provide a more comprehensive picture of this 
issue, and would also serve as a valuable reference for decision-makers.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Comparison of similarities and differences between AN (2007) and Wong, Wang and 
Xia (2005) 
 AN (2007) Wong, Wang and Xia (2005) 
Similarity 
Research on the relationship between institutional environment and 
auditing profession in China. 
Differences 
Supply Side: Research on the 
reporting behavior of auditors. 
Demand Side: Research on the 
auditor choice behavior of SOEs 
or non-state firms. 
Consider institutional aspect in 
testing auditors’ reporting 
behavior. 
Not consider institutional aspect 
in testing auditors’ reporting 
behavior. 
Research on the relationship 
between subsequent audit 
opinion and institutional 
environment. 
N/A 
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Appendix 2 
 
Credit market index, government decentralization index, and legal environment index for 
each region in 2000 
Rank Regions Credit Market Index 
Government 
Decentralization Index 
Legal Environment 
Index 
Total 
Marks 
1 SHANGHAI 7.94 7.49 6.98 22.41 
2 ZHEJIANG 7.68 8.37 6.24 22.29 
3 JIANGSU 7.67 8.12 6.29 22.08 
4 GUANGDONG 6.37 7.99 7.29 21.65 
5 SHANDONG 7.74 7.38 5.63 20.75 
6 HEBEI 7.2 7.13 5.15 19.48 
7 TIANJIN 5.34 6.05 6.96 18.35 
8 BEIJIN 3.85 6.4 7.97 18.22 
9 ANHUI 5.24 7.43 5.32 17.99 
10 LIAONING 6.16 6.14 5.53 17.83 
11 CHONGQING 6.33 7.61 3.83 17.77 
12 HAINAN 5.25 6.02 6.33 17.6 
13 FUJIAN 3.74 7.12 6.32 17.18 
14 JILIN 5.37 5.7 5.81 16.88 
15 GUANGXI 3.46 7.89 4.92 16.27 
16 HENAN 5.8 5.54 4.93 16.27 
17 JIANGXI 4.69 6.15 4.78 15.62 
18 YUNNAN 4.75 6.56 3.87 15.18 
19 GUIZHOU 4.89 5.43 4.36 14.68 
20 GANSU 4.7 5.94 3.98 14.62 
21 SHAANXI 5.88 5.3 3.21 14.39 
22 HUBEI 4.21 5.11 5.05 14.37 
23 HUNAN 5.9 5.73 2.62 14.25 
24 NINGXIA 4.36 3.79 5.16 13.31 
25 SICHUAN 0.7 7.43 4.69 12.82 
26 NEIMENGGU 3.42 3.27 4.93 11.62 
27 SHANXI 1.08 4.54 5.53 11.15 
28 HEILONGJIANG 1.89 3.6 5.34 10.83 
29 XINJIANG 0.9 3.16 4.1 8.16 
30 QINGHAI 0.35 3.04 4.69 8.08 
 
These three indices are based on the 2000 data from Fan and Wang (2003). The Credit 
Market Index, Government Decentralization Index, and Legal Environment Index measure 
the development of the local credit market, the degree of government involvement in the 
local economy, and the development of the local legal environment for each province or 
provincial level region, respectively. For the Credit Market Index, the larger the index, the 
more developed the credit market. For the Government Decentralization Index, the larger 
the index, the smaller the government involvement. For the Legal Environment Index, the 
larger the index, the better the legal environment. Fan and Wang (2003) do not provide an 
index for Tibet. The median of the “Total marks” is 16.28. The first 14 regions (shaded) 
are classified as “good institutional regions” and the last 16 regions “poor institutional 
regions.”  
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Table 1 Descriptive information on the data selection and audit opinions 
 
Panel A: Data Selection            
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1996-2005 
Total number of A-share firms 518 717 817 912 1045 1169 1233 1296 1371 1366 10444 
Less: Firms also having B-shares 68 73 76 78 82 86 86 86 86 86 807 
Less: Firms also having H-shares 13 17 18 19 19 24 27 29 29 30 225 
Less: Financial institutions 3 3 3 4 5 5 6 9 9 9 56 
Less: Firms in Tibet 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 40 
Less: Missing data 93 158 165 154 149 202 150 116 49 41 1277 
Total used 341 466 555 657 790 844 956 1048 1190 1192 8039 
            
Panel B: Types of audit opinion            
 1996(%) 1997(%) 1998(%) 1999(%) 2000(%) 2001(%) 2002(%) 2003(%) 2004(%) 2005(%) 1996-2005(%) 
Good institutional regions            
Unqualified 222(88) 255(83) 292(80) 347(80) 499(85) 546(87) 647(89) 761(94) 871(92) 883 (91) 5323(88) 
Qualified 29(12) 52(17) 75(20) 89(20) 89(15) 81(13) 79(11) 45(6) 74(8) 85(9) 698(12) 
Sub-total 251(100) 307(100) 367(100) 436(100) 588(100) 627(100) 726(100) 806(100) 945(100) 968 (100) 6021(100) 
Poor institutional regions            
Unqualified 87(97) 146(92) 173(92) 186(84) 180(89) 201(93) 209(91) 15(6) 225(92) 203 (91) 1625(81) 
Qualified 3(3) 13(8) 15(8) 35(16) 22(11) 16(7) 21(9) 227(94) 20(8) 21(9) 393(19) 
Sub-total 90(100) 159(100) 188(100) 221(100) 202(100) 217(100) 230(100) 242(100) 245(100) 224 (100) 2018(100) 
Total            
Unqualified 309(91) 401(86) 465(84) 533(81) 679(86) 747(89) 856(90) 988(94) 1096(92) 1086 (91) 7160(89) 
Qualified 32(9) 65(14) 90(16) 124(19) 111(14) 97(11) 100(10) 60(6) 94(8) 106(9) 879(11) 
Total 341(100) 466(100) 555(100) 657(100) 790(100) 844(100) 956(100) 1048(100) 1190(100) 1192(100) 8039(100) 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics on client firm characteristics partitioned by client ownership and auditor locale 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of all of the client firms (n = 8,039) 
  Good institutional regions Poor institutional regions 
  Local government-owned companies Non-local government-owned companies Local government-owned companies 
Non-local government-owned 
companies
  Local auditor (n=3,045) 
Non-local auditor 
(n=725) 
Local auditor 
(n=1,564) 
Non-local auditor 
(n=687) 
Local auditor 
(n=1,178) 
Non-local auditor 
(n=213) 
Local auditor 
(n=507) 
Non-local auditor 
(n=120) 
ROE Mean 0.019  0.021 -0.094 -0.320 0.054 -0.043 -0.041 -0.118
 Median 0.067 0.065 0.070 0.061 0.073 0.044 0.068 0.048 
 St.Dev 0.274  0.219 4.472 6.017 0.134 0.376 0.793 1.418 
Client Mean 21.084 20.947 20.990 20.933 20.766 20.617 20.661 20.628
 Median 21.044 20.906 20.890 20.812 20.704 20.667 20.638 20.564 
 St.Dev 0.874 0.837 1.001 0.969 0.845 0.675 0.867 0.739 
TD/TA Mean 0.468 0.467 0.471 0.472 0.438 0.474 0.461 0.450
 Median 0.473 0.472 0.487 0.475 0.429 0.469 0.447 0.434 
 St.Dev 0.184 0.180 0.188 0.179 0.167 0.177 0.190 0.191 
Cur_rat Mean 1.614 1.893 1.898 1.612 1.768 1.522 1.778 1.694
 Median 1.286 1.364 1.395 1.368 1.439 1.235 1.428 1.341 
 St.Dev 1.185 2.189 1.990 1.030 1.215 0.975 1.284 1.178 
Reciv Mean 0.096 0.118 0.113 0.109 0.110 0.101 0.134 0.104
 Median 0.071 0.093 0.091 0.090 0.087 0.085 0.117 0.083 
 St.Dev 0.087 0.095 0.098 0.088 0.099 0.081 0.098 0.081 
Inv Mean 0.163 0.168 0.169 0.150 0.136 0.134 0.147 0.138
 Median 0.128 0.139 0.135 0.130 0.115 0.107 0.131 0.099 
 St.Dev 0.143 0.141 0.145 0.119 0.102 0.115 0.096 0.142 
Loss Mean 0.019 0.023 0.020 0.029 0.008 0.047 0..018 0.058
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 St.Dev 0.136 0.151 0.139 0.168 0.092 0.212 0.132 0.235 
 
Data in Panel A is winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of local government-owned companies in good institutional regions (n=3,770) 
 
  Local auditor (n=3,045) 
Non-local auditor 
(n=725) p-value 
ROE Mean 0.019  0.021 0.900 
 Median 0.067 0.065 0.191 
 St.Dev 0.274  0.219  
Client Mean 21.084 20.947    0.000*** 
 Median 21.044 20.906    0.001*** 
 St.Dev 0.874 0.837  
TD/TA Mean 0.468 0.467 0.876
 Median 0.473 0.472 0.934 
 St.Dev 0.184 0.180  
Cur_rat Mean 1.614 1.893   0.000***
 Median 1.286 1.364    0.006*** 
 St.Dev 1.185 2.189  
Reciv Mean 0.096 0.118    0.000*** 
 Median 0.071 0.093    0.000*** 
 St.Dev 0.087 0.095  
Inv Mean 0.163 0.168 0.380 
 Median 0.128 0.139 0.035 
 St.Dev 0.143 0.141  
Loss Mean 0.019 0.023 0.410 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.499 
 St.Dev 0.136 0.151  
 
The p-values are from the t-tests for the means and the wilcoxon sign-ranked tests for the medians. 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of local government-owned companies in poor institutional regions (n=1,391) 
 
  Local auditor (n=1,178) 
Non-local auditor 
(n=213) p-value 
ROE Mean 0.054 -0.043    0.000*** 
 Median 0.073 0.044    0.000*** 
 St.Dev 0.134 0.376  
Client Mean 20.766 20.617   0.015** 
 Median 20.704 20.667 0.238 
 St.Dev 0.845 0.675  
TD/TA Mean 0.438 0.474  0.004**
 Median 0.429 0.469   0.017** 
 St.Dev 0.167 0.177  
Cur_rat Mean 1.768 1.522  0.005**
 Median 1.439 1.235  0.012* 
 St.Dev 1.215 0.975  
Reciv Mean 0.110 0.101 0.211 
 Median 0.087 0.085 0.775 
 St.Dev 0.099 0.081  
Inv Mean 0.136 0.134 0.778 
 Median 0.115 0.107 0.109 
 St.Dev 0.102 0.115  
Loss Mean 0.008 0.047    0.000*** 
 Median 0.000 0.000    0.000*** 
 St.Dev 0.092 0.212  
 
The p-values are from the t-tests for the means and the wilcoxon sign-ranked tests for the medians. 
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Panel D: Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of local government-owned companies audited by local auditors (n=4,223) 
  Good institutional regions (n=3,045)
Poor institutional regions 
(n=1,178) p-value 
ROE Mean 0.019  0.054 0.000***       
 Median 0.067 0.073 0.042**        
 St.Dev 0.274  0.134  
Client Mean 21.084 20.766 0.000***       
 Median 21.044 20.704 0.000***       
 St.Dev 0.874 0.845  
TD/TA Mean 0.468 0.438 0.000***       
 Median 0.473 0.429 0.000***      
 St.Dev 0.184 0.167  
Cur_rat Mean 1.614 1.768 0.000***       
 Median 1.286 1.439 0.000***      
 St.Dev 1.185 1.215  
Reciv Mean 0.096 0.110 0.000***       
 Median 0.071 0.087 0.007**        
 St.Dev 0.087 0.099  
Inv Mean 0.163 0.136 0.000***       
 Median 0.128 0.115 0.001***       
 St.Dev 0.143 0.102  
Loss Mean 0.019 0.008 0.017**        
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.025          
 St.Dev 0.136 0.092  
  The p-values are from the t-tests for the means and the wilcoxon sign-ranked tests for the medians. 
Definitions of variables: 
ROEit = net income/year-end total owners’ equity. 
Clientit = the natural logarithm of a firm’s year-end total assets. 
TD/TAit = the ratio of year-end total debt to total assets. 
Cur_ratit = year-end total current assets divided by year-end total current liabilities. 
Recivit = the ratio of year-end accounts receivable to year-end total assets. 
Invit = the ratio of year-end inventory to year-end total assets. 
Lossi2 =1, if a firm reported a loss for the two consecutive years preceding the reporting period, and 0 otherwise. 
***,**,* Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively 
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Table 3 Univariate test of auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments (n=8,039) 
 
     Good institutional regions       Poor institutional regions    
 Local government-owned companies 
Non-local government-owned 
companies 
 
 Local government-owned companies 
Non-local government-owned 
companies 
 
Local auditors 
 
(n=3045) 
Non-local 
auditors 
(n=725) 
Local auditors 
 
(n=1564) 
Non-local 
auditors 
(n=687) 
 
Local auditors 
 
(n=1178) 
Non-local 
auditors 
(n=213) 
Local auditors 
 
(n=507) 
Non-local 
auditors 
(n=120) 
 Number % Number % Number % Number %  Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Unqualified 
opinion 2,264 87 634 87 1396 89 629 92  1,104 94 174 82 450 89 109 91 
Qualified 
opinion 
 
 381  
______ 
 
 13  
_____ 
 
91 
_____ 
 
13 
____ 
 
168 
_____ 
 
11 
_____ 
 
58 
_____ 
 
8 
_____ 
 
 
74 
_____ 
 
6 
_____ 
 
39 
_____ 
 
18 
_____ 
 
57 
_____ 
 
11 
_____ 
 
11 
_____ 
 
9 
_____ 
 3,045 100 725 100 1564 100 687 100  1,178 100 213 100 507 100 120 100 
  =2χ 1.622, p=0.203 =2χ 2.794, p=0.095*  =2χ 34.965, p=0.000*** =2χ 0.432, p=0.511 
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Table 4 Multivariate test of auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments 
 
  Panel A: Good Regions  Panel B: Poor Regions 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  6.859    0.000***  5.487   0.033** 
LocAudit - 0.337   0.039**  0.299 0.467   
LocGovit ? 0.524   0.004**  0.968   0.021**   
LocAudit* LocGovit - -0.261 0.214  -1.326    0.004*** 
AuditSZit + 0.062 0.481  0.394  0.078* 
ROEit - -0.040 0.783  -1.023.   0.043** 
Clientit - -0.557    0.000***  -0.491    0.000*** 
TD/TAit + 4.430    0.000***  4.245    0.000*** 
Cur_rat it ? 0.077    0.000***  0.130  0.096* 
Reciv it + 0.668 0.103  -0.887 0.285 
Invit ? -1.283    0.000***  -1.629  0.097* 
Lossi2 + 0.608   0.007**  0.574 0.153 
Pseudo R2    0.108   0.17 
P-value       0.000***       0.000*** 
Sample size      n=6021      n=2018 
 
This table provides the logistic regression results for the different institutional regions of Model (1). 
Opit= 0λ + 1λ LocAudit+ 2λ LocGovi+ 3λ LocAudit*LocGovit+ 4λ AuditSZit+ 5λ ROEit+ 6λ Clientit+ 7λ TD/TAit+ 8λ Cur_ratit+ 9λ Recivit+ 10λ Invit+ 11λ Lossi2+ itε  
 
Opit = 1, if a company received qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
LocAudit = 1, if a company was audited by a local auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
LocGovit = 1, if a company was owned by a local government, and 0 otherwise. 
LocAudit*LocGovit = 1, if a local government-owned company was audited by a local auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
AuditSZit = 1, if a company was audited by a top 10 auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
ROEit = net income/year-end total owners’ equity. 
Clientit = the natural logarithm of a firm’s year-end total assets. 
TD/TAit = the ratio of year-end total debt to total assets. 
Cur_ratit = year-end total current assets divided by year-end total current liabilities. 
Recivit = the ratio of year-end accounts receivable to year-end total assets. 
Invit = the ratio of year-end inventory to year-end total assets. 
Lossi2 = 1, if a firm reported a loss for the two consecutive years preceding the reporting period, and 0 otherwise. 
 
***,**,* Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Table 5 Univariate test of local auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments (n = 6,294) 
 
 Good institutional regions Poor institutional regions
 Local government-owned companies 
Non-local government-owned 
companies   
Local government-owned 
companies 
Non-local government-owned 
companies 
 Number % Number % Number % Number %
Unqualified 
opinion 
 
2664 87 1396 89  1104 94 450 89 
Qualified 
opinion 381 13 168 11  74 6 57 11 
 
Total 
 
3045 
 
100 
 
1564 
 
100  
 
1178 
 
100 
 
507 
 
100 
 =2χ 3.087, p = 0.079*  =2χ 12.165, p = 0.000*** 
 
***Represents statistical significance at the 0.01level. 
 
 
 
 
 56
Table 6 Multivariate test of local auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments (n = 6,294) 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value
Model      0.000*** 
Intercept  6.416    0.000*** 
INSTit - -0.193 0.275 
LocGovit ? 0.260   0.013** 
INSTit*LocGovit - -0.607    0.006*** 
AuditSZit + 0.163   0.077** 
ROEit - -0.501  0.097* 
Clientit - -0.516    0.000***
TD/TAit + 4.143    0.000*** 
Cur_ratit ? 0.105    0.000*** 
Recivit + 0.702 0.069
Invit ? -1.440    0.000*** 
Lossi2 + 0.706   0.004** 
Pseudo R2           0.129 
P-value              0.000*** 
Sample size           6,294 
 
This table provides the logistic regression results for Model (2). 
Opit=βo+β1INSTit +β2LocGovit +β3 INSTit*LocGovit +β4AuditSZit + β5ROEit + β6Clientit + β7TD/TAit +β8Cur_ratit +β9Recivit +β10Invit + β11Lossi2 +εit 
The sub-sample comprises local auditors in good and poor regions. 
 
Opit = 1, if a company received a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise.  
INSTit = 1, if a company was audited by a local auditor from a poor institutional regions, and 0 otherwise. 
LocGovi t = 1, if a company is owned by a local government, and 0 otherwise. 
INSTit*LocGovit = 1, if a local government-owned company is audited by a local auditor from a poor institutional regions, and 0 otherwise. 
 
For the definition of the other independent variables, see the note to Table 4.  
 
***,** Statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively 
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Table 7 Univariate test of subsequent auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments (n=814) 
 
 
    Switch to a good institutional region        Switch to a poor institutional region    
 Local government-owned companies 
Non-local government-owned 
companies 
 
 Local government-owned companies 
Non-local government-owned 
companies 
 Local auditors Non-local auditors Local auditors 
Non-local 
auditors  Local auditors 
Non-local 
auditors Local auditors 
Non-local 
auditors 
 Number % Number % Number % Number %  Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Unqualified 
opinion 197 80 127 85 129 82 103 94  52 87 24 73 21 72 14 78 
Qualified 
opinion 
 
50 
______ 
 
20 
_____ 
 
23 
_____ 
 
15 
____ 
 
29 
_____ 
 
18 
_____ 
 
16 
_____ 
 
6 
_____ 
 
 
8 
_____ 
 
13 
_____ 
 
9 
_____ 
 
27 
_____ 
 
8 
_____ 
 
28 
_____ 
 
4 
_____ 
 
22 
_____ 
 247 100 150 100 158 100 119 100  60 100 33 100 29 100 18 100 
  2χ = 1.499, p = 0.221 2χ =1.202, p = 0.273  2χ = 2.769, p = 0.096* 2χ = 0.168, p = 0.682 
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Table 8 Multivariate test of subsequent auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments (n = 814) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table provides the logistic regression results for the different institutional regions in Model (3): 
Sub_Opit= 0α + 1α LocAudit+ 2α LocGovit+ 3α LocAudit*LocGovit+ 4α AuditSZit+ 5α ROEit+ 6α Clientit+ 7α TD/TAit+ 8α Cur_ratit+ 9α Recivit+ 10α Invit+ 11α Lossi2+ itε  
 
Sub_Opit= 1, if a qualified-and-switched company was qualified in period t after switching to a poor institutional region, and 0 otherwise.   
LocAudit = 1, if a company was audited by a local auditor in period t after switching, and 0 otherwise.  
LocGovit = 1, if a company is owned by the local government, and 0 otherwise.  
LocAudit*LocGovit = 1, if a local government-owned company was audited by a local auditor in period t after switching to a poor institutional region, and 0 otherwise.  
 
For the definition of the other independent variables, see the note to Table 4.  
***,**,* Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Good Regions Panel B: Poor Regions 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value  
Intercept  8.288  0.002 *** -5.435 0.576
LocAudit - 0.631  0.072 * 0.198 0.824  
LocGovit ? 0.404  0.267 0.081 0.924  
LocAudit*LocGovit - -0.365  0.426 -1.911 0.085 * 
AuditSZit + 0.081  0.739 2.249 0.009 *** 
ROEit - 0.019  0.078 * -4.401 0.026 ** 
Clientit - -0.625  0.000 *** 0.254 0.591  
TD/TAit + 5.158  0.000 *** 0.343 0.917  
Cur_ratit ? 0.158  0.148 -1.229 0.083  
Recivit + -0.171  0.850 -0.302 0.916
Invit ? -1.610  0.069 * 2.241 0.376 ** 
Lossi2 + 0.664  0.163 0.189 0.864
Pseudo R2        0.143 
         0.000*** 
       n=674 
         0.382 
            0.000*** 
          n=140 
P-value  
Sample size  
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Table 9 Univariate test of subsequent reporting behavior of local auditor in different institutional environments (n=494) 
 
 Switch to a good institutional region  Switch to a poor institutional region 
 Local government-owned companies 
Non-local government-owned 
companies   
Local government-owned 
companies
Non-local government-owned 
companies
 Number % Number %  Number % Number % 
Unqualified 
opinion 
 
197 80 129 82  52 87 21 72 
Qualified 
opinion 50 20 29 18  8 13 8 28 
 
Total 
 
247 
 
100 158 
 
100  
 
60 
 
100 
 
29 
 
100 
 =2χ 0.219, p = 0.640  =2χ 6.229, p = 0.013** 
 
**Represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 10 Multivariate test of subsequent reporting behavior of local auditors in different institutional environments (n = 494) 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value  
Model      0.000*** 
Intercept 5.180  0.089*
INSTit - 0.285 0.593 
LocGovit ? 0.027 0.929 
INSTit*LocGovit - -0.955 0.151
AuditSZit + 0.521  0.062* 
ROEit - -0.735  0.093* 
Clientit - -0.506    0.001***
TD/TAit + 6.447    0.000*** 
Cur_ratit ? 0.454    0.001*** 
Recivit + -0.183 0.850
Invit ? -2.576   0.022** 
Lossi2 + 1.012  0.084* 
Pseudo R2           0.221 
P-value              0.000*** 
Sample size          494 
 
This table provides the logistic regression results for Model (4). 
Sub_Opit=θo+θ1INSTit +θ2LocGovit +θ3 INSTit*LocGovit +θ4AuditSZit + θ5ROEit + θ6Clientit + θ7TD/TAit +θ8Cur_ratit +θ9Recivit +θ10Invit + θ11Lossi2 +εit 
The sub-sample comprises local auditors in good and poor regions. 
 
Sub_Opit = 1, if a company received a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise.  
INSTit = 1, if a company was audited by a local auditor from a poor institutional regions, and 0 otherwise. 
LocGovi t = 1, if a company is owned by a local government, and 0 otherwise. 
INSTit*LocGovit = 1, if a local government-owned company is audited by a local auditor from a poor institutional regions, and 0 otherwise. 
 
For the definition of the other independent variables, see the note to Table 4.  
 
***,** Statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively 
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Table 11 Sensitivity test for H1a: Multivariate test of auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table provides the logistic regression results for different institutional regions of Model (1).  
Opit= 0λ + 1λ LocAudit+ 2λ LocGovi+ 3λ LocAudit*LocGovit+ 4λ AuditSZit+ 5λ ROEit+ 6λ Clientit+ 7λ TD/TAit+ 8λ Cur_ratit+ 9λ Recivit+ 10λ Invit+ 11λ Lossi2+ itε  
Opit = 1, if a company received a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
LocAudit = 1, if a company was audited by a local auditor, and 0 otherwise.
LocGovit = 1, if a company is owned by the local government, and 0 otherwise. 
LocAudit*LocGovit = 1, if a local government-owned company was audited by a local auditor, and 0 otherwise.   
AuditSZit = 1, if a company was audited by a top 10 auditor, and 0 otherwise.
ROEit = net income/year-end total owners’ equity. 
Clientit = the natural logarithm of a firm’s year-end total assets. 
TD/TAit = the ratio of year-end total debt to total assets.
Cur_ratit = the year-end total current assets divided by year-end total current liabilities. 
Recivit = the ratio of year-end accounts receivable to year-end total assets. 
Invit = the ratio of year-end inventory to year-end total assets.
Lossi2 = 1, if a firm reported a loss for the two consecutive years preceding the reporting period, and 0 otherwise. 
***,**,* Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Good Regions  Panel B: Poor Regions
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value   
Intercept  6.766 0.000***  5.050 0.049**  
LocAudit - 0.289 0.076* 0.410 0.324
LocGovit ? 0.604 0.001***  0.732 0.087**  
LocAudit* LocGovit - -0.373 0.071*  -1.062 0.026**  
AuditSZit + 0.119 0.176 0.337 0.140
ROEit - -0.055 0.780  -0.924 0.078*  
Clientit - -0.550 0.000***  -0.481 0.000***  
TD/TAit + 4.315 0.000*** 4.725 0.000***
Cur_ratit ? 0.073 0.001***  0.149 0.062  
Recivit + 0.609 0.123  -0.895 0.302  
Invit ? -1.226 0.000*** -1.828 0.075*
Lossi2 + 0.641 0.004***  0.477 0.265  
Pseudo R2  0.105 
0.000*** 
n=6,308 
0.168 
  0.000*** 
   n=1,731 
P-value 
Sample size  
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Table 12 Sensitivity test for H1b: Multivariate test of local auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient        p-value  
Intercept  6.140 0.000***
INSTit - -0.017 0.929   
LocGovit ? 0.233 0.025** 
INSTit*LocGovit - -0.553 0.015** 
AuditSZit + 0.222 0.015** 
ROEit - -0.510 0.097*  
Clientit - -0.506 0.000***
TD/TAit + 4.112 0.000***
Cur_rat it ? 0.106 0.000***
Recivit + 0.655 0.088*  
Invit ? -1.377 0.000***
Lossi2 + 0.728 0.003** 
Pseudo R2 0.124 
P-value 0.000*** 
Sample size 6,294 
 
This table provides the logistic regression results for Model (2). 
Opit=βo+β1INSTit+β2LocGovit+β3INSTit*LocGovit+β4AuditSZit+β5ROEit+β6Clientit+β7TD/TAit+β8Cur_ratit+β9Recivit+β10Invit+β11Lossi2 +εit 
 
Opit = 1, if a company received a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
INSTit = 1, if a company was audited by a local auditor from a poor institutional region, and 0 otherwise. 
(In this test, Henan and Guangxi are defined as good provinces) 
LocGovit = 1, if a company is owned by a local government, and 0 otherwise. 
INSTit*LocGovit = 1, if a local government-owned company was audited by a local auditor of poor institutional regions, and 0 otherwise. 
 
For the definition of the other independent variables, see the note to Table 4.  
***,** Statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
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Table 13 Sensitivity test for non-local auditor reporting behavior in different institutional environments (n = 1,745)  
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value  
Model   0.000***    
Intercept 6.740 0.001***    
INSTit - -0.137 0.716       
LocGovit ? 0.544 0.003**     
INSTit*LocGovit - 0.368 0.394       
AuditSZit + -0.062 0.757       
ROEit - -0.004 0.851       
Clientit - -0.547 0.000***    
TD/TAit + 4.659 0.000***    
Cur_ratit ? 0.061 0.009**     
Recivit + -0.497 0.576       
Invit ? -1.321 0.047*      
Lossi2 + 0.627 0.056*      
Pseudo R2           0.112 
P-value              0.000*** 
Sample size           1,745 
 
This table provides a sensitivity test based on the logistic regression of Model (2). 
Opit=βo+β1INSTit +β2LocGovit +β3 INSTit*LocGovit +β4AuditSZit + β5ROEit + β6Clientit + β7TD/TAit +β8Cur_ratit +β9Recivit +β10Invit + β11Lossi2 +εit 
The sub-sample comprises non-local auditors in good and poor regions. 
 
Opit = 1, if a company received a qualified opinion, and 0 otherwise.  
INSTit = 1, if a company was audited by a local auditor from a poor institutional region, and 0 otherwise. 
LocGovi t = 1, if a company is owned by the local government, and 0 otherwise. 
INSTit*LocGovit = 1, if a local government-owned company was audited by a local auditor from a poor institutional region, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
For the definition of the other independent variables, see the note to Table 4.  
 
***,** Statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
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Figure 1 A political-economic model of auditor reporting in poor institutional 
regions (Hypothesis 1a) 
 
 
 
Figure 1 represents Hypothesis 1a, which states that compared with non-local 
auditors in poor institutional regions, local auditors (LocA) in these regions are more 
likely to issue clean audit opinions to local government-owned companies (LocG), 
ceteris paribus. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 A political-economic model for auditor reporting in poor and good 
institutional regions (Hypothesis 1b) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 represents Hypothesis 1b, which states that compared with local auditors in 
good institutional regions, local auditors in poor institutional regions are more likely 
to issue clean opinions to local government-owned companies, ceteris paribus.  
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